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We address the informational and strategic impacts of real earnings man-
agement (REM) in a two-period oligopoly model with one-sided information.
For the strategic impacts of REM, once the demand falls short of expectation,
a rm should raise the price instead of cutting it to reach the earnings target.
For the informational impacts, to maintain opponents' uncertainty, the pri-
vately informed rm could conceal its identity by taking a mixed strategy and
setting the rst period price to be higher than in the separating equilibrium.
Finally, the presence of tunnelling from cross-shareholding rm will enhance
the price cut in the second period.




The issue of real earnings management (REM) has attracted increas-
ing attention, especially following the outbreaks of several nancial crises
when there are calls for tightening the accounting standards to reduce man-
agement's discretion in nancial reporting. REM refers to management's
discretion in structuring real activities that deviate from normal business
practices, including the manipulation of operating and investing activities
as well as the manipulation of nancial activities. Accruals manipula-
tion is more likely to draw the auditor's or regulator's attention than real
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activities on pricing and production. Hence, although real activities ma-
nipulation potentially imposes greater long-term impacts on the company,
managers are more willing to manipulate earnings through real activities
than to manipulate accruals (see Roychowdhury, 2006)
The REM manipulation, however, will create further informational and
strategic impacts on the real activities. First, as described, REM is gaining
in popularity because it can be mixed with normal real activities and hence
is dicult for auditor or even the opponent to detect. For the opponent,
the suspicion that a rm might be dishonest on earnings report will create
additional uncertainty that can aect the opponent's real activities. Under
such uncertain circumstance, it is interesting to ask if it is possible for the
rm to take advantage of its opponent's uncertainty, to seduce the opponent
to react less aggressively, and to achieve the desired earnings target? If the
answer is yes, then in order to maintain the opponent's uncertainty, should
some strategic actions be taken before the demand uncertainty realizes to
be short of expectation? The empirical research by Burgstahler and Eames
(2003) also mentioned this uncertainty. They studied whether analysts are
able to identify which specic rms engage in earnings management, using
data from Zacks Investment Research, and concluded that analysts are
unable to consistently identify the specic rms that engage in earnings
management to avoid small losses. Our study will further explore this
informational impact on the opponent's decisions in real activities.
Second, REM activities might induce strategic reactions from the oppo-
nents. For example, when uncertain market demand falls short of expecta-
tion, unilateral operating activities such as a price cut can increase a single
rm's return that helps achieving the earnings target.(see Jiang, 2008).
But, this is only part of the story. It is well known that since rms are
strategic complements with price competition, the opponent's best reply
to a price cut is to cut its own price (see Shy, 1997). As a result, all rms
end up with lower prices and lower prots in equilibrium.1 For the rm
that initiates a price cut to meet its earnings target, if this REM activity
is fully anticipated, the situation can only become worse o.
To examine the informational and strategic impacts of REM activities,
we build up a two-period oligopoly model where the opponent is uncer-
tain about a rm's objective type (prot-maximizing or target-reaching),
and characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria where a rm's price can
partially reveal its objective type. The private information on a rm's ob-
jective type is assumed to capture the opponent's suspicion about the rm's
honesty on earnings report. Regarding to the strategic impacts of REM,
we conclude that once the demand falls short of expectation, a targeting
1By prot maximization, since the market prices have deviated from the prot maxi-
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type of rm should raise the price, instead of cutting it, so that the prot-
reducing price war can be avoided. Next, for the informational impacts,
we show in a hybrid equilibrium that in order to maintain the opponent's
uncertainty about a rm's objective type, the privately informed rm has
an incentive to conceal its identity by taking a mixed strategy and setting
the rst period price to be higher than in the separating equilibrium. This
result illustrates the evidence that rms cut their prices around the scal
quarter-end to reach the earnings target (Oyer, 1998; DeGeorge, et. al,
1999; Chapman and Steenburgh, 2010). Gunny (2010) also concluded that
real activities manipulation is positively associated with rms just meeting
earnings benchmarks (zero and last year's earnings).
Our study is related to the literature on earnings management in com-
petitive markets. As explained, the presence of competition can change the
results that are intuitively correct in the case of a single rm. Although
many articles have examined earnings management and income smoothing
in a single rm framework (Lambert, 1984; Dye, 1988; Fudenberg and Ti-
role,1995), only a few papers address earnings management in competitive
markets, and most of them dealt with the issues of accruals managemen-
t2. Our study is dierent from the existing literature in focusing on the
informational impacts of REM. The manipulation on real activities will
provide a noisy signal for the signaling rm's strategic and information-
al incentives, and this complexity might give a better picture why REM
imposes a greater long term impact. Moreover, the private information in
our model is about the signaling rm's "objective type". The uncertainty
about the objective type reects the opponent's doubt about the signaling
rm's honesty (on earnings report). We are interested in how each side (the
informed and uninformed) takes advantage of this incomplete information
and how it is related to the REM activities.
Since earnings management often occurs in pyramids or family-owned
rms,3 the model can be slightly extended to consider the impacts of cross-
shareholding on a rm's REM activities. In this respect, our study is related
to Riyanto and Toolsema (2008), who presented a model of tunneling in a
pyramidal ownership structure. Tunneling refers to controlling sharehold-
ers shifting resources from one rm to another in the same pyramid. They
compared the pyramidal ownership structure with the horizontal ownership
structure, and showed that tunneling may justify the pyramidal structure
only in the presence of myopic investors or in combination with propping.
By taking a dierent approach, our study shows that the presence of tun-
nelling from cross-shareholding rm will enhance price cuts in the second
2Ewert and Wangenhofer (2005) analyzed the eect of varying accounting standards
on accounting quality. Bagnoli and Watts (2009) studied an incomplete information
Cournot duopoly model where each rm is privately informed of its production cost.
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period. Tunnelling from a lower-end rm in the pyramidal chain can reduce
REM activities' strategic impacts on its own industry, which hence permits
more aggressive actions. Our focus on REM through prices and that we
consider the informational and strategic impacts of REM on non-member
competitors are both absent in Riyanto and Toolsema's model.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe
a two-period oligopoly model with asymmetric information. The private
information is about the signaling rm's objective type: prot-maximizing
or target-reaching. The objective function for each type of the signaling
rm and the sequence of actions are provided here. Section 3 characterizes
the separating and hybrid Bayesian equilibria of the game. The hybrid
equilibrium suggests that the targeting type may take actions to deliber-
ately maintain the opponent's asymmetric information. Section 4 contains
the concluding remarks. For ease of presentation, all long derivations and
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
In order to examine the strategic and informational impacts of REM, this
section describes a two-period oligopoly model with one-sided incomplete
information. The private information concerns with a rm's honesty on
nancial reporting. We will demonstrate that with this uncertainty, the
REM activities will not be fully anticipated by the opponents and hence it
is possible for a rm to take advantage of this uncertainty and reach the
desired earnings target.
textbfThe Environment Specically, we consider three rms in two in-
dustries with uncertain demands. Firm 1 and rm 2 provide dierentiated
products in the rst industry, and rm 3 is the monopolist in the second in-
dustry. Following Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), we assume the
following (inverse) demand structures. For the rst industry, the demand
is given by4
Qi(pi;pj;") = a   pi   pj + ";
where pi and pj; for i;j = 1:2, denote rm i and j's price, respectively.
 represents the the degree of substitution; The two products are comple-
ments for  > 0, and they are substitutes for  < 0. The random term "
catches the market uncertainty, which is assumed to be distributed over [-
";"] according to a nondecreasing distribution function F("), with a density
f("):
4We have assumed specic function forms to better illustrate the market equilibrium.
More general assumptions will not change our main results.THE INFORMATIONAL AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS 367
To examine the REM impacts on pyramids or family-owned businesses
(see Wang, 2006), we assume that rm 1 holds a proportion  of stock
shares in rm 3. Firm 3 is the monopolist in the second industry, whose
demand is given by
Q3(p3;") = a   p3 + ":
Without loss of generality, we assume a linear cost function for all three
rms: ciQi; for i = 1;2,3.
FIG. 1. The Sequence of Moves.
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FIG. 1. The Sequence of Moves.  
2.1. The Sequence of Moves
The production of the three rms lasts for two periods, for which one
can consider the situation that full-year earnings consist of two half-year
earnings, or consist of peak and o-peak season earnings. Figure 1 presents
the sequence of actions for this game.
To illustrate the uncertainty about a rm's honesty on earnings report,
we assume that before competition, rm 1 is privately informed of its objec-
tive type k, which can be either a prot-maximizing (m) or target-reaching
type (r). The prot-maximizing type pursues prot maximization in each
period, while the target-reaching type achieves an earnings threshold. The
uncertainty about rm 1's objective type reects the opponent's doubt
about rm 1's honesty (on earnings report).
With asymmetric information, rm 1 and rm 2 compete in prices in
the rst industry, and rm 3 produces the monopoly output. At the end
of period one, rm 2 updates its belief about rm 1's objective type after
observing rm 1's rst period price, and the targeting type of rm 1 will
determine the extent of REM according to its realized prot. In period
two, the three rms compete once again in two markets with uncertain
demand, and the second period prots realize in the end.368 SHIRLEY J. HO AND HAO-CHANG SUNG
Information To describe the uncertainty about rm 1's objective type,
we give more denitions as follows. First, denote t, t = 1;2; as the
opponent rms' beliefs (prior and ex post) that rm 1 is a maximizing
type, and (1   t) that it is a targeting type. Here and henceforth, we use
a superscript t to denote the variables in period t. Second, let t
i represent
















Third, to distinguish the pricing strategy for each type of rm 1, let pt
1(k)
denote the price set by type k (k = m;r) of rm 1 in period t:


















3 = (1   )t
3(pt
3;"t):
Remind that  is the proportion of rm 3's stock shares that rm 1 holds.
Next, we describe the objective functions for each type of rm 1 and the
opponent rms.
(1) Maximizing Type of Firm 1







i) for i = 1;2;3; (1)
where E is the notion of expectation over the demand shock ": Notice that
throughout this paper, we have assumed no discounting for simplication.






i for i = 1;2;3: (2)
Remind that there is still demand uncertainty in the second period, so the
notion of expectation still appears in equation (2).
(2) Targeting Type of Firm 1
If rm 1 is a targeting type, then rm 2 and rm 3's rst period objectives
remain the same as equation (1), but rm 1's rst period objective is to
nd a p1
1 to reach some earnings target , that is,
E(1
1 + 2
1)  : (3)THE INFORMATIONAL AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS 369
This earnings target can be the zero earnings, previous period's earnings,
or analysts' forecasts (See Levitt, 1998; Graham, et. al. 2005, Zhang and
Kang, 2007)
In the second period, since the rst period shock "1 has realized, the
targeting type of rm 1 needs to calculate the extent of earnings man-





3;"1) denote rm 1's rst






3;"1): For simplication, we will abbreviate this dif-
ference as b (p1
1(m);p1
1(r);"1):
There are two approaches to reach this target: rm 1 can reach the target
either by manipulating prices in the oligopoly market, or by tunnelling the
required prot from the partner rm 3. In countries with weak legal in-
vestors protection, tunnelling is often seen in the pyramids or family-owned
business (Johnson, et. al., 2000). Here, following the notion by Jian and
Wong (2010), Friedman, et. al. (2003) and Riyanto and Toolsema (2008),
tunneling refers to a transfer of resources from a lower-end rm to a higher
rm in the pyramidal chain. Djankov, et. al. (2008) noted that related
party transactions may provide direct opportunities for related parties to
extract cash from listed companies through tunneling activities. Cheung,
et. al. (2006) and Bertrand, et. al. (2002) empirically concluded that the
minority shareholders in these rms seem to be subject to expropriation
through tunneling. The details for the two approaches are given as follows.
(a) Price Manipulation Without tunneling from rm 3, the targeting
type of rm 1 can only strategically choose its price to reach the second




1  b (p1
1(m);p1
1(r);"1): (4)
Firm 2 and rm 3's objectives remain the same as equation (2).
(b) Tunnelling from Firm 3 Tunnelling from a lower-end rm in the
pyramidal chain can reduce REM activities' strategic impacts on the rst
industry, but at the cost of the low-end rm's prot. To capture the notion
of tunnelling, denote D as the size of prot to be tunnelled from rm 3,
with 0  D  b (p1
1(m);p1
1(r);"1): Let c(D); with c0(D) > 0, denote the
tunnelling cost. The optimal level of tunnelling can be endogenously de-
termined by the marginal condition, where c0(D) is equal to the marginal
benet of tunnelling D. Since our focus is on REM, we will assume for
simplication that there exists a unique value satisfying this marginal con-
dition, and to abuse the notation, we denote this value as D.
Thus, given the level of D, the objective function of the targeting type
is to nd a p2






3;"2)-D]-c(D)  b (p1
1(m);p1
1(r);"1)-D: (5)370 SHIRLEY J. HO AND HAO-CHANG SUNG








Following the literature, we assume that the rst period belief 1 with
0 < 1 < 1 is exogenously given as prior belief. The second period belief
2 will be endogenously determined by the prior belief 1 and rm 1's rst
period pricing strategies (p1
1(m);p1
1(r)): We will discuss the o-equilibrium
path beliefs shortly while characterizing the equilibrium.
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF EQUILIBRIUM





3); for a given level of posterior belief 2 and the rst





3), and interpret the setting of on and o-equilibrium
path beliefs 2. Notice that, in addition to considering the opponent's re-
action to earnings management in the second period, we are interested in
knowing whether strategic actions have to be taken in the rst period when
rm 1 wants to take advantage of the private information to mitigate the
damage from a price war. As mentioned earlier, the pricing strategy can
be interpreted as a result of earnings management or of a purely strategic
concern. If a price cut is recognized as a purely strategic action, then it
can induce retaliation from the opponent. Hence, the targeting type of rm
1 may have an incentive to signal itself out from the maximizing type at
t = 1.
3.1. Market Equilibrium for t = 2
The second period market equilibrium is dierent from that of the rst
period in mainly three aspects. (i) Since it is the last period, rm 1's
pricing strategy has no signaling indication; (ii) Firm 2 uses the posterior
belief 2 instead of the prior belief to calculate the expected prot 2
2;
(iii) The targeting type of rm 1 now needs to reach a target depending
on the rst period market equilibrium and the random demand shock "1:
As noticed earlier, rm 1 can reach the target either through manipulating
prices in the market or by tunnelling from partner rm 3. Here we will
provide the detailed characterization for each alternative, and then derive
the rst period market equilibrium.
(1) Price Manipulation
In the beginning of the second period, all rms can observe the rst
period market equilibrium and the realized random shock "1; both of whichTHE INFORMATIONAL AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS 371
will determine the threshold b (p1
1(m);p1
1(r);"1): As for the second period
belief 2 (on and o-equilibrium path), we will discuss in more details when
we characterize the rst period equilibrium, and for the moment the value





3) simultaneously in the second period.


































2 + c1): (6)
For the targeting type of rm 1, denote p2
























Next, rm 2 chooses p2
































Figure 2 depicts the best replies of rm 2 and the targeting type, given a
level of p2
1(m). The reason for taking p2
1(m) as given is because this value
will be uniquely determined by equation (6). Since the targeting type of
rm 1 can choose among a range of feasible prices to reach the target,
the best replies of p2
1(r) are indicated by the shadow area in the diagram.
Accordingly, one can expect many equilibrium prices in the second period.
Since there is no obvious criterion to rule out any equilibrium, we will focus
on those equilibria which can be supported by the evidence.372 SHIRLEY J. HO AND HAO-CHANG SUNG
FIG. 2. Best replies of p2
1(r).
Finally, rm 3 chooses p2



















(a + c3): (9)
The second period market equilibrium is determined by equations (6)~(9)
simultaneously. To describe the equilibrium properties, notice rst that
the rst period equilibrium will aect the continuation payo through the
Bayesian updating for 2; as well as through the level of b (p1
1(m);p1
1(r);"1);
which will determine p2
1(r): Second, as a benchmark of comparison, we
denote (p
1;p










i as the respective prot.
Lemma 1. For the target type of rm 1 to reach a 2
1 > 
1 in the second
period; it needs to set a p2
1(r) higher than p
1 for both  < 0 and  > 0:
Proof. Notice that 2
1(2;p2
1(r);p2
2;"2) is concave in p2
1(r) and decreas-
ing in p2
2: If the targeting type of rm 1 is to set a prot higher than 
1; it
requires a p2
2 higher than p









1(r) higher than p
1: Similarly, we can argue for the case  > 0:THE INFORMATIONAL AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS 373
Lemma 1 shows that once the market demand falls short of expectation,
a targeting type of rm should raise the price, instead of cutting it, so that
the prot-reducing price war can be avoided. However, this does not violate
the empirical results that rms cut their prices to reach the earnings target.
We will demonstrate shortly that, due to the informational concern, there
exist equilibria where rms raise prices in the rst period, and then cut the
prices in the second period.
Next, since the set of p2
1(r) is aected by the level of b (p1
1(m);p1
1(r);"1);







The following lemma describes the properties of the equilibrium payo
when the targeting type of rm 1 needs to reach a target higher than 
1:
Lemma 2. If the targeting type of rm 1 needs to reach a target higher
than 












1(r)) for the targeting type will increase
with b , and decrease with "1:
Proof. (i) Notice rst that 2
1(2;p2
1(r);p2
2;"2) decreases with p2
2: Next,
as described, p2
1(r) is higher than p
1 when  < 0; and thus 2p2
1(m)+(1 
2)p2
1(r) will decrease with 2: The same argument applies to  > 0: (ii)
Notice that 1
1 increases with "1; and by denition, b  will decrease with
"1:
Lemma 2 explains how the equilibrium prot is aected by the second
period target and the posterior belief. Since both of them are inuenced
by the targeting type's rst period price, this result is important for the
targeting type's strategic concern in the rst period. Next, the relation
between rm 2's beliefs and rm 1's equilibrium payo seems to vary with







1(r)); and for  > 0; the
inequality is reversed.
Finally, consider two target levels: b  and b 0 with b  < b 0: This lem-
ma says that the lower bound of 2
1(2;b ;p2
1(m);p2








1(r)) is smaller than 2
1(0;b 0;p2
1(m);p2
1(r)): Since the cross eect is small-








Lemma 3. The lower bound and feasible set of p2
1(r) will increase with
b (p1
1(m);p1
1(r);"1) and decrease with "1:374 SHIRLEY J. HO AND HAO-CHANG SUNG
Proof. First, notice that b  will decrease with "1. Next, by Lemma 2, as
^
 increases, the lower bound of prot for the targeting type 2
1(:) will in-
crease. Finally, according to Lemma 1, as the dierence between targeting
type's target and 




Remind that b (:)     1
1(:): Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 indicate that
as b  increases, the lower bound and the feasible set of p2
1(r) will increase.
Moreover, since 1
1(:) is concave in p1
1(k); k = m;r, the impact of p1
1(k) on
b  will depend on the relative sizes of p1
1(k) and p
1.
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 describe that the degree of REM will decrease
with the business state. Cohen and Zarowin (2007) found empirical evi-
dence that the tendency for rms to meet or beat earnings benchmarks is
signicantly related to the P=E ratio.
(2) Tunnelling from Firm 3
With tunneling from rm 3, the two types of rm 1, rm 2 and rm 3 are
facing the following problems. First, the best replies for the maximizing
type of rm 1 and rm 2 are the same as equations (6) and (8). Second,







3;"2)-D)-c(D))  b (p1
1(m);p1
1(r);"1)-D; (10)
where we have assumed D to be the optimal level determined by the
marginal condition, and to simplify the analysis, we assume that c0(D) <
(1-): The set of feasible p2








































The term c(D)-(1-)D is decreasing with D, and hence the lower bound
of the targeting type will decrease with D.
Finally, rm 3 chooses p2
3 to maximize E((1-)[2
3(p2
3;"2)-D]): Since the
presence of D does not aect the decision of optimal price, p2
3 remains the
same as equation (9).
Tunnelling from a low-end rm in the pyramidal chain can reduce REM's
strategic impacts on the rst industry, but at the cost of the low-end rm's
prot. The required prot to be manipulated by the targeting type of rm
1 will decrease with D. If D is high enough, then according to Lemma 1,
it is possible for the targeting type to change the second period price to
be a more aggressive level. Since b  decreases with D, the impact of D on
the equilibrium prot will be negatively related to those of b  (see Lemma
2 and 3).THE INFORMATIONAL AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS 375
3.2. Market Equilibrium for t = 1
The rst period prices of the two types of rm 1 have two eects. (i) They
relate directly to the rst period prots, which together with the random
shock, indirectly determine the required prots for the targeting type of
rm 1 in the next period. These will change the second period prices for
the targeting type of rm 1, which, in turn, aects p2
2: (ii) They will change
rm 2's belief about rm 1's objective type, the impact of which, according
to Lemma 1 and 2, will depend on whether the targeting type of rm 1
needs to set a level higher than 
1: In other words, there is coordination
between rm 1's rst period prices and its second period prices.
In this section, we will consider two groups of perfect Bayesian equilibria:
separating and hybrid equilibria (see for example Gibbons, 1992). In the
separating equilibrium, each type of rm 1 is willing to express its identity,
so that in the second period, rm 2 will charge a price best t to each
type, instead of a price that is best reply to a weighted sum of p2
1(m) and
p2
1(r): In the hybrid equilibrium, a certain type of rm 1 is not willing to
express its identity, so that in the second period, this particular type of
rm 1 can take advantage of the impact on 2; and of the fact that rm
2 will charge a price best replying to a weighted sum of p2
1(m) and p2
1(r):
Dierent from the standard signaling game literature, here the incentive
constraints for the equilibrium are not given exogenously; They will be en-
dogenously determined by the market equilibrium. In what follows, we will
rst characterize the incentive constraints for each equilibrium, and then
check if there exists any market equilibrium to satisfy these constraints.





characterized above, each rm's intertemporal prots are given as follows.
Since both b  and p2
1(r) are aected by "1; we will rewrite the expected





1(r)) in order to
capture the impact from the rst period shock.
The maximizing type of rm 1 needs to nd a p1
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Meanwhile, rm 2 chooses p1















































Finally, rm 3 seeks for a p1



















As described in Lemma 3, the level of b  will aect the lower bound
of p2
1(r); and b  is aected by the rst period equilibrium and the random
shock. Since 1
1 is increasing in "1; let "(p1
1(m);p1
1(r);p1
2) denote the thresh-
old value of "1 such that 1
1 = 




prot target for the targeting type of rm 1 is less than 
1; and according
to Lemma 1, it will set a p2
1(r) less than p
1 for both  < 0 and  > 0: The




2) will increase with p1





Proof. Notice that 1
1 decreases with p1
2 and increases with "1: As p1
2
increases; it requires a higher "1 to keep the prot xed at 
1; and hence we
have the result. For the second part, if p1
1 > p
1; then 1





2) increases with p1
1:
(1) Separating Equilibrium
In the separating equilibrium, each type of rm 1 is willing to express
its identity, so that in the second period, rm 2 will charge a price best
t to each type, instead of a price that is best reply to a weighted sum
of p2
1(m) and p2
1(r): As described earlier, the rst period equilibrium will
aect the continuation payo in three aspects: (i) It determines 2; (ii)THE INFORMATIONAL AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS 377
The equilibrium payo 1
1 aects the level of b ; which in turn aects the
setting of p2
1(r); (iii) It aects the possibility that the targeting type of rm
1 could set a price less than p
1 in the second period. We are interested in
equilibria where the targeting type of rm 1 sets a price higher than p
1;
and cuts the price in the second period, which hence explains the evidence






1 denote the equilibrium prices
for the maximizing type and targeting type, respectively. Remind that p1
2
is determined by equation (14). We consider the following beliefs for the
second period:
2 = 0 for p1
1  p1
1(r);
= 1 for p1
1 < p1
1(r):
This setting includes the on-equilibrium path belief which is calculated by
Bayes' rule, and the setup for the o-equilibrium path belief is referred to
Gibbons (1992).
After replacing 2 with the above setting, we rewrite the intertemporal












































Here and henceforth, we denote p2
1(r) as the targeting type's second pe-
riod price for cases where the targeted prot is higher than 
1: Similarly,
denote p2
1(r) as the targeting type's second period price for cases where the
targeted prot is less than 
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Maximizing Type of Firm 1 For (p1
1(m), p1
1(r)) to be a separating
equilibrium, it is required that for the maximizing type of rm 1, (i) p1
1(m)
maximizes the intertemporal prot in (16), meaning that the equilibrium
prot is higher than any (p10
1 (m), p1
1(r)) with p10
1 (m) 6= p1
1(m) and 2 = 1;
(ii) The equilibrium prot is at least greater than that of mimicking the
targeting type and setting prices and belief to be (p1
1(r), p1
1(r)) and 2 = 1:
In our terms, the rst condition is equivalent to the marginal condition that
the partial derivation of (16) with respect to p1
1(m) is equal to zero. The
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Note that p1
1(r) > p1





























































d" = 0; (17)








1(r)) for simplication: The same abbreviation will
apply to equation (19).
Targeting Type of Firm 1 For the targeting type, it is only required
that the intertemporal prot satises: E(1
1 + 2
1)  : Notice that for
the targeting type, as long as this target is reached, it is not necessary for
this type to pursue the highest prot; Once the target is reached, it has no
incentive to mimic the maximizing type for better prot. Hence, dierent
from the traditional incentive constraint, for p1
1(r) to be in the separating
equilibrium, we need
  : (18)
Overall, the separating equilibrium is determined by the marginal con-
dition in (16), equation (17) and equation (18). The following proposition
describes the equilibrium properties for both of the pure price manipulation
and tunnelling cases.
Proposition 1. There exists a separating equilibrium where the tar-
geting type of rm 1 sets a price higher than the maximizing type, and







Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition addresses the strategic impact of REM. We show that
when a rm has the incentive to meet the earnings target, it will alter its
pricing strategy accordingly. In particular, the targeting type of rm 1 will
set a high price in the rst period and then cut the price in the second380 SHIRLEY J. HO AND HAO-CHANG SUNG
period to meet the earnings target. This is consistent with the empirical
results that rms cut their prices around the scal quarter-end to reach
the earnings target. For example, Oyer (1998) showed that manufacturing
rms often oer price discounts to temporarily increase sales at the end of
the scal year. Chapman and Steenburgh (2010) found that soup manufac-
turers increase the frequency and change the mix of marketing promotions
(price discounts) at the scal quarter-end when they need to meet earnings
target. Next, this result is compared to the cases with tunnelling from rm
3.
Proposition 2. The second period prices in this separating equilibrium
are lower with the presence of tunnelling.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Proposition 5 we characterize the equilibria where rms may raise
prices in the rst period and cut the prices in the second period to boost
up earnings. Proposition 6 shows that the extent of such a price discount
will increase with the presence of partial ownership in the partner rm.
This is consistent with the empirical results on REM. Mizik and Jacob-
son (2007) presented evidence that rms inate current-term earnings by
cutting marketing expenditure at the time of a seasoned equity oering.
Cohen, et. al. (2009) also found that managers, on average, reduce adver-
tising spending to avoid losses and earnings decreases. They reported that
rms in the late stages of their life cycle can increase advertising to meet
earnings benchmarks, and provided evidence that rms increase advertis-
ing in the third month of a scal quarter and in the fourth quarter to beat
prior year's earnings. Chapman and Steenburgh (2010) found that soup
manufacturers increase the frequency and change the mix of marketing
promotions when they need to meet earnings target.
(2) Hybrid Equilibrium
In a hybrid equilibrium, a certain type of rm 1 is not willing to express
its identity, so that in the second period, this particular type of rm 1 can
take advantage of the impact on 2( which will be higher than 1) and the
fact that rm 2 will charge a price best replying to a weighted sum of p2
1(m)
and p2
1(r): This benet happens in cases with p2
1(m) < p2
1(r); and hence p2
2
will be set at least higher than p
2 (provided that  < 0): According to Lem-
ma 1, the targeting type needs to set a price high enough to reach the target,




















equilibrium prices, and remind that p1
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consider the following beliefs for the second period:
2 =
1(1   )




= 1 for p1
1 6= p1
1(r):
Maximizing Type of Firm 1 After replacing 2 with the above setting
we can rewrite the intertemporal prot for the maximizing type of rm 1.
Note rst that the mixed strategy between p1
1(m) and p1
1(r) indicates that
the intertemporal prot for these two alternatives are the same. That is,
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Targeting Type of Firm 1 For the targeting type of rm 1, the in-













































For the targeting type, it is only required that the intertemporal prot
satises: E(1
1 + 2
1)  : Hence, for p1
1(r) to be the equilibrium strategy,
we need
b   : (20)
Overall, the hybrid equilibrium is determined by the marginal condition in
(16)', equation (19) and equation (20). The following proposition describes
the equilibrium properties for both of the pure price manipulation and
tunnelling cases.
Proposition 3. There exists a hybrid equilibrium where the maximizing
type of rm 1 takes a mixed strategy, and the rst period price is higher
than in the separating equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition addresses the informational impact of REM. In order
to maintain the opponent's uncertainty about rm 1's objective type, rm
1 has the incentive to conceal its identity by taking a mixed strategy (so
that rm 2 cannot fully learn about its type) and charge a rst period
price higher than in the separating equilibrium. This result is accordance
with the evidence of contagion in managing earnings intra-industry. Kedia,
et. al. (2010) examined the GAO reports and found that rms are more
likely to manage earnings after public announcement of a restatement by
another rm in their industry. Also, Chapman (2011) and Karaoglu, et. al.
(2006) shows that a rm's price discount to meet earnings target can induce
competitors within their industry to follow. Next, this result is compared
to the cases with tunnelling from rm 3.THE INFORMATIONAL AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS 383
Proposition 4. The set of hybrid equilibrium decreases when there is
tunnelling from the cross-shareholding rm.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Similar to the separating equilibrium, in Proposition 7 we characterize
equilibria where rms may strategically raise prices in the rst period and
cut the prices in the second period to boost the earnings, and in Propo-
sition 8 we show that the extent of price discounting could increase with
the cross-shareholding of the opponent rms. Tunnelling from a lower-end
rm in the pyramidal chain can reduce the strategic impacts of REM on
the rst industry, which hence permits more aggressive actions. Moreover,
in the hybrid equilibrium, rm 1 can take advantage of the opponent's
asymmetric information to induce a favorable response from the rival. We
also show that tunneling from the aliated rm may decrease the required
extent to reach the earnings target. Johnson, et. al. (2000) showed that
entrepreneurs often tunnel resources out of rms in country with weak
investors protection. Chapman (2011) and Karaoglu, et. al. (2006) men-
tioned that rms' marketing action (such as sales promotion, price dis-
count) to boost earnings may induce competitors within their industry to
follow. Jian and Wong (2010) found evidence that controllers of Chinese
listed companies engage in tunnelling through related sales. When the list-
ed rms have incentives to meet securities regulators' earnings target, the
increase of sales will mitigate negative industry earnings shocks.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The outbreaks of several nancial crises have attracted increasing at-
tention to management's discretion in nancial reporting. REM activities,
compared to accruals manipulation, are less likely to be detected by au-
ditors and regulators, and hence managers are more willing to manipulate
earnings through real activities rather than to manipulate accruals. In this
article, we have addressed the informational and strategic impacts of REM
on the real production activities. These issues are important but have not
received much theoretical discussion. The informational impact addresses
that, since REM is dicult for both auditors and the opponents to detect,
the opponent's suspicion that a rm might be dishonest on earnings report-
s will create an additional uncertainty which can aect the real activities.
Second, REM activities can induce strategic reactions from the opponents,
and the results can be worse than before the REM manipulation.
To examine the informational and strategic impacts of REM activities,
we build up a two-period oligopoly model where the opponent is uncer-384 SHIRLEY J. HO AND HAO-CHANG SUNG
tain about a rm's objective type (prot-maximizing or target-reaching),
and characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria where a rm's price can
partially reveal its objective type. The private information on a rm's
objective type is assumed to capture the opponent's suspicion about this
rm's honesty on earnings report. For the two impacts of REM activi-
ties, we have the following conclusions. First, for the strategic impacts of
REM, we conclude that once the demand falls short of expectation, the
equilibrium way to reach the earnings target is to raise the price, instead
of cutting it, as this can avoid the prot-reducing price war. However, this
does not violate the empirical results that rms cut their prices around
the scal quarter-end to reach the earnings target, as there exist equilibria
where rms strategically set higher prices in the rst period, and then cut
the prices in the second period. Second, for the informational impacts, we
show in a hybrid equilibrium that in order to maintain the opponent's un-
certainty about a rm's objective type, the privately informed rm has the
incentive to conceal its identity by taking a mixed strategy, and charge a
rst period price higher than the separating equilibrium. Finally, we show
that the presence of tunnelling from cross-shareholding rm will enhance
price cuts in the second period. Tunnelling from a lower-end rm in the
pyramidal chain can reduce REM activities' strategic impacts on its own
industry, which hence permits more aggressive actions.
APPENDIX A
Proof (Proof of Proposition 5). The conditions for the separating e-
quilibrium consist of the marginal condition of (16), equations (17), and
equation (18). We will demonstrate the case with  < 0 here and the
explanation applies to the case with  > 0 similarly.
For  < 0; let p1




1 be the equilibrium prices: By the con-














This indicates that the rst term in equation (17) should be positive.


























1(m) + (1   1)p2
1(r)  p2
1(m): The latter condition implies that
p2
1(r) > p2
1(m); 8"1; where p2








1(r); then the equal-




1(m), illustrating the prices cut in the second period.THE INFORMATIONAL AND STRATEGIC IMPACTS 385













2;"1);the second period target prices
^
 will
be higher with p1








1(r)) higher than 
1+2
3; for which it re-
quires 2
3(r)  
1; and hence p2
1(r) > p2
1(m):
Proof (Proof of Proposition 6). With the presence of cross-shareholding
and tunneling from rm 3, when D increases,
^
 decreases. Thus, according
to Lemma 2 and 3, the lower bound and feasible set of p2
1(r) will de-
crease, which means that the second prices of the target type will be low-
er.
Proof (Proof of Proposition 7). The conditions for the hybrid equilibri-
um consist of the marginal condition of (16)', equations (19), and equation
(20). We will demonstrate the case with  < 0 here and the explanation
applies to the case with  > 0 similarly.
For  < 0; let p1




1 to be the equilibrium prices. By concavi-














Lemma 4. This indicates that the rst term in equation (19) is positive.


























1(m)+ (1   2)p2
1(r)  p2
1(m): The latter condition implies that
p2
1(r) > p2
1(m); 8"1; where p2








1(r); then the equal-




1(m), illustrating the price cut in the second period.













2;"1); the second period target
^
 will
be higher with p1








1(r)) higher than 
1 + 2
3; for which it
requires 2
1(r)  
1; and hence p2
1(r) > p2
1(m):Finally, since the maximiz-
ing type of rm 1 takes a mixed strategy p1
1(m)+(1 )p1
1(r) at the rst
period, we can observe p1
1(m) + (1   )p1
1(r) higher than p1
1(m); 8  2
(0;1):
Proof (Proof of Proposition 8). From equation (19), we know that 2 will
aect 2
1; and that 2 is calculated through Bayes' rule. With the presence
of cross-shareholding and tunneling from rm 3, when D increases,
^
 will
decrease. According to Lemma 2 and 3, the lower bound and feasible set386 SHIRLEY J. HO AND HAO-CHANG SUNG
of p2
1(r) will decrease, and the set of hybrid equilibrium will decrease accord-
ingly.
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